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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to illustrate the 
components of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as 
outlined by the Alliance for Progress and the 1984 National 
Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America.
Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and 
the success of its application during the Alliance for 
Progress, does the theory of underdevelopment and violence 
represent a viable foundation for United States foreign 
policy?
The results of this study suggest that the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence in its present form, does not 
represent a viable foundation for United States foreign 
policy in underdeveloped countries of the world. The theory 
consists of an unproven set of assumptions that do not 
establish a solid foundation for foreign policy. In 
addition, the application of the theory during the Alliance 
demonstrated numerous problems. First, the theory is based 
on U.S. middle class values and desires. Its success is 
dependent upon the acceptance of these values in societies 
where middle class values are not the same. Second, 
business interests affect foreign policy and they do not 
necessarily coincide with economic, political, and social 
development policies. And third, during the Alliance, the 
theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived and 
implemented without the participation of many traditional 
foreign policy actors. Once those traditional players were 
called upon to implement the Alliance, they were able to 
transform the program to suit their interests and concerns. 
Due to the nature of the U.S. foreign policy process, it is 
likely that the theory of underdevelopment and violence 
would be subjected to the same pressures if it were to be 
set in motion again.
v
UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
Throughout much of the world, United States security 
interests are bound to the well-being of friendly countries 
Many of these countries are economically, politically, and 
militarily strong and secure. Thus, U.S. interests for the 
most part seem relatively safe. However, in other parts of 
the world, U.S. interests appear threatened by the economic 
political, and social crises present in friendly developing 
countries. For example, in the Philippines, where U.S. 
military forces at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval 
Base help to maintain a deterrent to the growing Soviet 
military presence in the Pacific, the fledgling government 
of Corazon Aquino faces a persistent communist insurgency 
from the New People's Army (NPA), a stagnating economy, and 
dissident elements of the old Marcos regime, all of which 
seem to threaten the U.S. facilities. In Central America, 
the challenge to U.S. interests are present as well. The 
devaluation of the Mexican peso and falling world market 
prices for petroleum have helped spawn resentment and 
dissatisfaction with Mexico's ruling Institutional 
Revolutionary party (PRI). In Guatemala and El Salvador, 
stagnating economies and dismal social and political
3conditions are accompanied by various intensities of 
insurgent warfare. The persistent question that foreign 
policy makers face is how can the United States safeguard 
its interests in developing countries which are experiencing 
such problems?
Although the U.S. has striven to protect its interests 
through the use of military force, economic assistance, 
sanctions, and embargoes, support of friendly political 
groups, and the marshalling of international condemnation or 
support, it is the policy of lending U.S. assistance, 
specifically to improve a developing county's economic, 
political, and social plight, that forms the topic of this 
discussion.
Academic writings and debates of the late 1950s spawned 
a theory which serves as the nucleus for the construction 
and implementation of United States foreign policy in 
underdeveloped nations of the world. This theory assumes 
that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause 
instability, violence, a potential for communist revolution, 
and thus a threat to U.S. security interests. Therefore, 
this theory reasons, United States interests can be defended 
successfully by overcoming the conditions of 
underdevelopment through the extension of economic, 
political, and social assistance.
This guide for foreign policy was the centerpiece of a 
U.S. sponsored hemisphere-wide initiative called the
4Alliance for Progress and recently endorsed by the 1984 
National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America.
This thesis asks, based on an assessment of its accuracy and 
validity and the success of its application during the 
Alliance for Progress, whether this theory of 
underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation 
for United States foreign policy.
In order to answer this question the components of the 
theory of underdevelopment and violence must be explored.
Chapter one of this thesis will examine the Alliance for 
Progress and the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report 
on Central America to uncover the concepts of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence. Chapter two will seek to 
establish the validity and accuracy of the theory and 
chapter three will attempt to assess, with the aid of three 
different perspectives, the success of its application 
during the Alliance for Progress. As a result of this 
examination, a judgement can be made in the fourth and 
concluding chapter regarding the theory's viability as a 
basis for United States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.
CHAPTER I
In 1961, President Kennedy announced the commencement 
of a multi-million dollar program to assist Latin America 
countries and christened it the Alliance for Progress. 
Kennedy characterized its scope as similar to that which was 
needed to rebuild the economies of Western Europe after 
World War II."1 More than twenty years after this 
declaration, in 1984, the National Bipartisan Commission 
Report on Central America— popularly referred to as the 
Kissinger Commission— released its findings and 
recommendations. What these two seemingly unrelated events 
have in common is the articulation of a theory which serves 
as a method for understanding the relationship of conditions 
and events in underdeveloped countries— Latin America 
specifically— and as a focal point for the conception and 
implementation of United States foreign policy. This theory 
proposes that economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist 
encroachment.
This chapter examines the Alliance for Progress and the 
National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America, 
not only to illustrate their similarities, but also to
5
6illuminate the components and concepts of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence. The theory is based on four 
assumptions which are specified in official documents and 
statements from the period of the Alliance for Progress and 
in the findings and recommendations of the 1984 National 
Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. Examining 
the foreign policy record during the Alliance and the 
findings and recommendations of the Commission will 
illuminate the similarities between the Alliance and the 
Commission, as well as the components of the theory of - 
underdevelopment and violence.
The first assumption indicates that economic, 
political, and social underdevelopment lead to violence and 
instability. It was believed that frustration over these 
conditions caused people to react violently. The second 
assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause 
the root conditions, economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be 
characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment 
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster 
increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes 
that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, 
and instability encourage communist subversion and 
revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that 
violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be 
stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social
7development. However, because these three areas of 
underdevelopment appear interdependent, it is reasoned that 
improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will 
not necessarily halt violence, instability, or communist 
intrusion. As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the 
programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the 
Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political, 
and social development programs to overcome violence, 
instability, and communist encroachment.
Before examining the assumptions underlying the theory 
of underdevelopment and violence, it is necessary to define 
economic, political, and social underdevelopment. The 
search for the meaning of these terms exposes the use of a 
combination of examples to form definitions for economic, 
political, and social underdevelopment. In effect, the 
Commission Report and policymakers during the Alliance 
attached several, yet similar, meanings to each area of 
underdevelopment. For example, economic underdevelopment, 
often regarded as economic recession, was also interpreted 
to include high unemployment, decreasing or low gross 
national product (GNP), a high trade deficit, or a straining 
national debt. Political underdevelopment was defined as 
inadequate governmental services, but also the absence of 
democratic institutions and processes. From the viewpoint 
of Alliance policymakers and Commission members, political 
underdevelopment constituted lack of free elections,
8effective public forums and processes by which citizens can 
express opinions freely and influence public policy.
Finally, the definition of social underdevelopment includes 
inequitable income, tax, and land distribution, poverty, 
malnutrition, and inequitable access to education, housing, 
water, and medical facilities. Like economic and political 
underdevelopment, social underdevelopment was characterized 
in a number of ways.
In order to comprehend the theory of underdevelopment 
and violence it is necessary to understand how policymakers 
during the Alliance and the Commission members viewed the 
conditions in Latin America. Both were certain that Latin 
America exhibited symptoms of underdevelopment— poverty, 
frustrated expectations, social and political injustice, and 
economic recession to name a few. Compounding these 
maladies were uncontrolled population growth and 
urbanization which, according to the Commission Report, 
"magnified the problems of inequitable distribution of 
national income and overwhelmed the limited resources that 
governments were prepared to devote to social services."2 
Borrowing statistics provided by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA), the Commission report estimated that 
of the 23 million inhabitants of Central America, 14 million 
could be classified poor and from that number one-third 
lacked a nutritionally adequate diet.3
In 1961, the year in which the Alliance for Progress
9was launched, President Kennedy's delegates to the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council meeting at Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, recognized Latin America's economic, 
political, and social underdevelopment. Their findings 
detailed deficiencies in housing, water, and medical 
facilities, substandard working conditions and low wages, 
the need for agrarian and tax reform, increased literacy, 
improvement of the balance of trade, the stimulation of 
private investment and enterprise, and the lack of 
democratic institutions and processes.4 According to the 
Commission and policymakers during the Alliance, these 
conditions provided the impetus for violence and 
instability.
The first assumption of the theory of underdevelopment 
and violence indicates that economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment produce violence and instability. The 
Commission found that those nations in Latin America who 
responded to this threat with increased economic, political, 
and social development "have been marked by a stability 
astonishing in light of the misery which still afflicts the 
hemisphere."5 Nevertheless, in sounding a warning to those 
nations failing to come to grips with underdevelopment, 
Commission member Edward Marasciulo of the Pan American 
Development Foundation, indicated that they would continue 
to face violence and political instability.6 In more 
menacing terms, the Commission compared the human need of
10
Latin Americans to "tinder waiting to be ignited" into a 
conflagration that could threaten the entire hemisphere.7
Utilizing the same assumption during the Alliance, 
policymakers were convinced that if Latin American 
governments were to be spared revolution, economic, 
political, and social progress commensurate to the 
aspirations of their people must be undertaken.8 According 
to Wymberly Coerr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs in 1961, unless hope could be 
given to the masses of Latin America, mounting frustration 
and unrest caused by economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment would lead to further violence and 
destruction. Based on an analysis of the type of violence 
and instability plaguing Latin America, Coerr insisted that 
continued economic, political, and social underdevelopment 
would cause many Latin Americans to seek relief through 
radical transformation of their economic, political, and 
social structures.9 Equally vehement about the prospects 
for escalating violence was Assistant Secretary of State 
Thomas Mann, who warned that "support of the status quo will 
only invite more violent and destructive change."10
One example of the problems caused by underdevelopment 
was the issue of land reform in Latin America.
During the Alliance, the land distribution problem in Latin 
America provided policymakers with clear evidence that 
social underdevelopment— specifically the need for land
11
reform— was a major contributor to the atmosphere of
violence and instability. In the predominantly agricultural
countries of Latin America, ownership of land reflects
personal wealth as well as political and social status. As
a result, Latin American countries were commonly
characterized by a few of the nation's elite owning most of
the arable land while the majority of the poor scratched out
an existence on meager plots. Lester D. Mallory, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, addressed
this dilemma of the landless masses when he stated:
Picture the social and political effects, the 
political dynamite, of having hundreds of 
thousands of tiny exhausted [land] holdings 
side by side with tremendous estates that, as 
often as not, are under-cultivated and managed 
for absentee landlords.11
The Commission report and policymakers during the 
Alliance theorized that economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment caused violence and instability. The 
second assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence demonstrates that violence and instability cause 
the root conditions, economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be 
characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment 
leads to violence and instability which, in turn, fosters 
increased underdevelopment.
Experience with the Alliance illustrated that a leading 
deterrent to the success of any assistance program would be 
the instability and violence that assistance programs were
12
initially conceived to battle. Undoubtedly, equitable 
distribution of land, construction of schools, or improved 
medical care, all equally important policy goals in the 
fight for social development, could not take place in the 
midst of a revolution, and unquestionably, that is exactly 
where the development programs were needed the most. Both 
the Alliance policymakers and members of the Commission 
realized that a cyclical process takes place where 
instability and violence, initially provoked by 
underdevelopment, would continue to perpetuate the status 
quo and thwart development. This phenomenon is identified 
by policymakers during the Alliance and by members of the 
Commission— especially in the case of private U.S. 
investments.
The Alliance for Progress and the Commission report 
relied on private investment as a key to alleviating a 
myriad of development problems. In fact, investment and 
loans from private businesses and lending institutions 
represented a sizable portion of development assistance 
during the Alliance and for the programs envisioned by the 
Commission. During the Alliance, David E. Bell, 
Administrator for the Agency for International Development, 
asserted that applying private investment could lead to the 
"amelioration of the region's most basic problems."12 
However, like other aspects of development aid, violence and 
instability tended to drive away private investors before
13
they were able to extend assistance.
Experience during the Alliance's first year taught 
Peter R Nehemkis, Washington Counsel for the Whirlpool 
Corporation, that the threat of revolution in Latin America 
had disheartened even the most speculative investor. As 
early as 1962, Nehemkis concluded that the political 
environment in Latin America proved inhospitable for private 
U.S. investors.13
Reporting similar experiences, the Commission estimated 
that before 1984, regional tension and political unrest had 
resulted in a 3 billion dollar capital flight from Central 
America.14 In the face of this deteriorating investment 
climate, the Commission's primary objective prior to 
instituting development plans required cessation to violence 
and civil strife. According to the Commission, "no need is 
more basic for the success of economic, political, and 
social progress, than the elimination of the fear of 
brutality inflicted by arbitrary authority and terrorism, 
and the establishment peace."15
The Commission report and the policymakers during the 
Alliance recognized that the impediments to private 
investment resulted from the cyclical nature of 
underdevelopment and violence, which hindered providing 
assistance. However, the conditions in Latin America which 
contributed to the escalation of violence and made the 
commitment of assistance more difficult served as a catalyst
14
for communist subversion and revolution.
The third assumption of the theory of underdevelopment 
and violence illustrates that the degenerating cycle of 
underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourages 
communist subversion and revolution. The theory proposes 
the stimulus for the spread of communism in Latin America is 
underdevelopment. It was believed by policymakers during 
the Alliance and by members of the Commission that to blame 
ferment and distress in Latin America merely on communism 
was incorrect. Communism is a result, not a cause, it acts 
to "exploit weakness in the political, economic, and social 
fabric of Central America."16 And, as a result of this 
frailty, according to Commission member Carl Gershman, 
Central America presents an inviting target for communist 
insurgency.17
Similarly, in 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, R. R. Rubottum, suspected that 
dissatisfaction with existing conditions and a yearning for 
change bred frictions and frustrations which served only to 
make Latin American societies more susceptible to communist 
influences.18 Confirming this view before a 1963 
Congressional Committee on communist subversion in Latin 
America, Lt. General Joseph F. Carol, Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, pointed out that social 
inequalities and economic stagnation proved ideal conditions 
in which communist subversion could flourish.19
15
What appeared to enhance the Marxist revolutionaries' 
appeal to many Latin Americans, according to the Commission 
report, was the belief that communists represented society's 
only vehicle for economic, political, and social reform.20
During the Alliance, this conviction was equally 
popular. Lester Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs during the Alliance, found 
that land inequality in the rural territories of Latin 
America provided the communists with a powerful political 
tool. By proposing expropriation and redistribution of 
land, the communists were able to transform these areas into 
bastions of popular support.21 While in the urban areas, by 
speaking out against social inequalities, communists attempt 
to seduce the population into viewing them as the true 
champions of democracy.22 But perhaps even more threatening 
than the communists' appeal to the disillusioned is 
their political and military affiliation with communist 
countries.
Policymakers during the Alliance considered the Soviet 
Union the primary sponsor of communist revolutionaries in 
Latin America. Relying on proxies such as Cuba, the Soviets 
provided arms, indoctrination, training, and support to 
those who were willing to foment revolution.23 Not only was 
Cuba judged to be the platform from which a communist 
infiltration and attack would be launched, but also as the 
central location from which the final drive to bring Latin
16
America into the communist world would occur.24
Similarly, the Commission identified Cuba as the center 
for supervision and control of training camps and 
indoctrination schools, where trainees would receive up to 
six months of instruction in guerrilla warfare, strategy, 
weapons, propaganda, and agitation.25 As a result, the 
Commission characterized Cuba as "the country best prepared 
and most eager to exploit the intensifying crisis in Central 
America."26
With the fall of Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza
in 1979, and the Sandinista takeover and subsequent
alignment with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua had become, in
the eyes of the Commission, the primary threat to Central
America. Characterized as a "mainland platform" for
communist subversion, Nicaragua was considered a "crucial
steppingstone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed
struggle in Central America."27 According to Commission
member, Ambassador William H Luers:
The potential for the consolidation of a 
Sandinista Marxist-Leninist government, allied 
with the Soviet Union and Cuba and committed to 
the export of revolution across its land 
boarder, contribute significantly to the 
region's disorder."28
A huge military buildup, coupled with an apparent intention
to use it to promote revolution in neighboring countries,
indicated to the Commission that Nicaragua's commitment to
the cause of armed struggle in the region would not
diminish.29
17
Motivated by this threat to hemispheric security, both 
the Commission and policymakers during the Alliance for 
Progress foresaw an assistance plan designed to attack the 
foundations of instability, violence, and communist 
encroachment. The fourth assumption of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence indicates that violence, 
instability, and communist encroachment can be stopped by 
bringing about economic, political, and social development. 
However, because economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment appear interdependent, it is reasoned that 
improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will 
not necessarily halt violence, instability, or communist 
intrusion. As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the 
programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the 
Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political, 
and social development programs to overcome violence, 
instability, and communist encroachment.
The Commission's findings and recommendations and the 
development programs initiated by the Alliance for Progress 
can be characterized as a blueprint for the long-term 
restructuring of Latin American societies based on the 
theory of underdevelopment and violence. William C.
Doherty, Commission member and representative of the 
American Institute for Free Labor Development, echoed the 
Commission's hope for applying United States resources to 
promote economic development and advance democratic and
18
social reforms when he said:
The required political, economic, and social 
changes imply a long-term commitment from the 
United States. What is being suggested here is 
nothing short of a peaceful long-term 
democratic revolution— the changing of 
political systems and overcoming social 
injustice that have plagued the masses of 
Central America for centuries.30
Similarly, the necessity of guiding the evolution of 
Latin American societies was met with the same enthusiasm 
during the Alliance. Reflecting these views during 
Congressional hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1964, Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas 
Mann, reiterated that the Alliance for Progress
. . . serves the security interests of the 
United States by supplementing the efforts of 
American Republics to build viable, expanding 
economies that are better able: To provide the 
jobs, food, education, and other necessities 
required for their fast growing populations; To 
promote the growth of democratic institutions;
To support the desires of their peoples for 
political and economic freedom; . . .31
To combat the spread of violence, instability, and 
communism, the theory of underdevelopment and violence 
proposes attacking the very foundation upon which these 
problems take root. Once economic, political, and social 
development takes hold, frustration and violence, which 
germinate the seeds of communist subversion, are eliminated. 
However, arguing that the crisis of underdevelopment cannot 
be considered in just economic or political terms, the 
Commission pointed out that without improvement in all three 
areas of underdevelopment a viable long-term process of
19
development cannot take place. Accordingly:
The requirements for the development of 
Central America are a seamless web. The 
actions we recommend represent an effort to 
address this complex interrelationship in its 
totality not just its parts.32
To illustrate its point, the Commission noted that in 
spite of impressive economic advances in Latin America 
during a period in which economic issues and programs were 
emphasized, "the fruits of [this] expansion were distributed 
in a flagrantly inequitable manner."33 For example, Central 
America experienced an average annual increase in GNP of 2.5 
percent during the late 1960s, nevertheless, the residual 
political and social underdevelopment continued to foster an 
atmosphere of violence and instability. Consequently, the 
Commission concluded that "unless economic recovery is 
accompanied by social and political reform, additional 
financial support will ultimately be wasted."34
Kennedy administration officials also recognized the 
interdependence of economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment. Assailing just social or economic 
problems seemed wasteful when achievements such as an 
increase in GNP could not restrain continuing frustration 
and violence sparked by stagnant or worsening political and 
social conditions. This interdependence of conditions 
appeared in the maldistribution of land in Latin America. 
According to the Congressional testimony of Raymond J. Penn, 
professor at the University of Wisconsin:
20
Land ownership in Latin America is more than 
just the control and ownership of the land 
resource. It is the web on which the existing 
economic, social, and political structure 
rests.35
Land ownership equates to status in one's community, freedom 
to act and speak freely, an opportunity to education, and 
ultimately the right to share in the control of the 
government. Therefore, it seemed obvious that attacking 
just economic, political, or social conditions alone would 
not solve the current dilemma. According to President 
Kennedy, in order for the Alliance to succeed, political 
freedom must accompany material and social p r o g r e s s .3^ The 
success of applying the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence to the crisis in Latin America rested upon the 
precept that "social and political progress is not a 
substitute for economic progress but an essential condition 
of it."37
The programs envisioned by the Commission report not 
only parallel those of the Alliance for Progress, but also 
serve as evidence for the assumption that violence, 
instability, and communist aggression can be combatted with 
development programs. A review of these recommendations 
will help to illustrate this assumption.
The short-term plans recommended by the Commission 
concentrate on: First, adopting and promoting a Central 
American Common Market; Second, increasing U.S. bilateral 
economic assistance ($400 million) to create jobs and
support balance of trade deficits? Third, aid for labor 
intensive projects such as housing; Fourth, trade credit 
guarantees; Fifth, refinancing trade deficits? And sixth, 
supporting a Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI). As long-term development policies, the Commission 
proposed instituting a $24 billion dollar aid package made 
up of public and private sector grants, loans, and 
investments, creation of a Central America Development 
Organization (CADO) whose Central American staff would 
review and recommend aid plans, and support of the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative which would establish duty-free entry for 
Central American goods into the U.S. and between Central 
American nations. In the realm of political development, 
the Commission envisioned grants, loans, and investments for 
democratic institutions and leadership training. Financial 
assistance would be used to encourage grass-root political 
participation through neighborhood groups and regional 
cooperatives. Finally, social development schemes proposed 
by the Commission included food aid, expanded literacy 
programs through the Peace Corps, 10,000 scholarships to 
U.S. colleges, family planning programs, and technical 
assistance for health care, disease control, and housing 
projects. According to the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence, the introduction and success of these programs 
will lead to economic, political, and social improvements 
which will cause a reduction in violence, instability, and
22
communist encroachment.
In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence can be summarized as four assumptions outlined in 
the official documents and statements of the period during 
the Alliance for Progress and by the findings and 
recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission Report 
on Central America. The first assumption indicates that 
economic, political, and social underdevelopment lead to 
violence and instability. It was believed that frustration 
over these conditions caused people to react violently. The 
second assumption illustrates that violence and instability 
cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be 
characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment 
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster 
increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes 
that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, 
and instability encourage communist subversion and 
revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that 
violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be 
stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social 
development. However, because these three areas of 
underdevelopment appear to be closely interdependent, it is 
reasoned that improvements in one or two areas of 
underdevelopment will not necessarily halt violence, 
instability, or communist intrusion. As a result, the
23
theory, as evidenced by the programs of the Alliance and the 
recommendations of the Commission, places equal reliance on 
economic, political, and social development programs to 
overcome violence, instability, and communist encroachment.
The enormity of the project proposed by the 
Commission and undertaken during the Alliance presents 
numerous opportunities to discuss the practical application 
of each measure. However, the immediate question concerns 
the validity and accuracy of the theory of underdevelopment 
and violence. Does this theory represent a realistic view 
of the causes of instability and violence? With this 
question in mind, the following chapter will examine a body 
of literature known as cross-national causal analysis. As a 
result of this review, we may be equipped to judge the 
theoretical value of the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence better.
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CHAPTER II
The theory of underdevelopment and violence proposes 
that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause 
violence, instability, and communist penetration. However, 
can it be stated with certainty that economic, political, 
and social underdevelopment cause violence, instability, 
and communist encroachment? Are all three conditions of 
underdevelopment equally important or does economic 
underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability? 
Finally, do the relationships proposed by the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence provide the foundation for 
clearly defined policies with specific objectives? With 
these questions in mind, this chapter will survey a body of 
literature dealing with cross-national causal analysis and 
seek to establish the validity and accuracy of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence.
Three articles on cross-national causal analysis, the 
first by William H. Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, the second 
by Peter and Anne Schneider, and the third by Ted Gurr, form 
the basis of this investigation. By quantifying and 
qualifying the indicators of underdevelopment these authors 
have attempted to establish statistical relationships
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between various aspects of economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment and violence.
The first study, "Patterns of Political Violence In 
Comparative Historical Perspective," by William Flannigan 
and Edwin Fogelman, examines the proposition that domestic 
political violence is the result of a country's economic and 
democratic underdevelopment. In other words, political 
violence is more likely to occur in countries characterized 
by low levels of economic and democratic development and 
countries with developed economies and sturdy democratic 
institutions are likely to be relatively violence free. It 
is essential to point out that these studies are not 
concerned with criminal violence such as robbery or murder, 
but with political violence directed at political 
institutions and policies. The domestic political violence 
index used by Flannigan and Fogelman is characteristic of 
this genre of comparative study. The authors' index 
includes political assassinations, riots, coups d' etats, 
rebellions, and civil wars.
The first proposition to be tested states that violence 
is directly linked to a country's level of economic 
development. As economic development increases over time, 
political violence will decrease in frequency and magnitude. 
Conversely, as economic underdevelopment increases over 
time, political violence will increase in frequency and 
magnitude. The level of economic development (the dependent
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variable) of each country is categorized in one of four 
patterns.
Pattern One
Continuous low level of development. More than 
60 percent of the work force engaged in 
agriculture.
Pattern Two
More than 60 percent of the work force engaged 
in agriculture by 1900 and more than 35 percent 
of the work force engaged in agriculture by 
1960.
Pattern Three
Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged 
in agriculture by 1900 and less than 35 percent 
of the work force engaged in agriculture by 
1960.
Pattern Four
Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged 
in agriculture by 1860 and less than 25 percent 
of the work force engaged in agriculture by 
1960.1
Based on the statistical relationships that emerged,
the authors asserted that "the most violent countries tend
to be those at the lowest levels of economic development,
with a decreasing incidence of domestic violence as we move
from pattern one, two, three, and four."2 In fact, such a
"direct and consistent" association exists between the
incidence of political violence and patterns of economic
development, the authors claim:
The incidence of domestic political violence 
during the 2 0th century in countries which have 
begun their economic development in this 
century is not unlike the incidence of violence 
in countries which are now highly developed but
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were themselves in the process of development 
in the 19th century.3
In order to test their second proposition, which 
focuses on democracy and violence, the authors constructed 
an eight point index of democracy based on forms of 
selection of chief executive, political competition, extent 
of suffrage, and degree of political suppression. Stated 
simply, the authors propose that violence is more likely to 
occur in countries ranked low on democracy and less likely 
in those ranked high. Although their conclusions indicated 
that democratic countries experienced relatively low levels 
of political violence, these low levels were more closely 
associated with steady economic growth.4 Therefore, because 
economic development exhibited a stronger statistical 
relationship to violence the authors conclude that "the 
critical factor in explaining the relative absence or 
abundance of violence is the pattern of economic development 
rather than the type of regime."5
In another examination of internal political violence, 
Peter and Anne Schneider, in their work, "Political 
Institutions and Comparative Violence," compare violence to 
social mobilization, economic development, and the strength 
of political institutions. Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman, 
the Schneiders argue that economic development alone has no 
direct impact upon the maintenance of political order. 
"Rather, according to the data presented, political violence 
is most likely to occur when the development of strong
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political institutions lags behind the process of social 
mobilization."6
Social mobilization is the process in which old social, 
economic, and psychological commitments are replaced be new 
patterns of socialization and behavior. Mobilization is 
assumed to increase the overall quantity of political 
demands. A transformation from a rural to a predominantly 
urban society and from an agricultural to an industrial 
society characterize the Schneiders' definition of 
mobilization as well as another author's definition of 
modernization. For example, Karl W. Deutsch believed 
mobilization occurred during modernization, i.e., where 
advanced non-traditional practices in culture, technology, 
and economic life are introduced and accepted on a 
considerable scale.7 According to the Schneiders, improved 
economic conditions and strong political institutions 
primarily ease tensions among people by satisfying new 
demands created by mobilization. Drawing on the work of 
Samuel P. Huntington, the Schneiders measure the strength of 
political institutions (institutionalization) based on 
adaptability (age of the nation's constitution and major 
political parties), complexity (expenditure of the central 
and local governments social welfare services)) coherence 
(percentage of the cabinet positions held by the majority 
party and the total number of different parties represented 
in the cabinet), and legitimacy (a value judgement based on
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the number of parties opposed to the structure of the 
political system).8 Therefore, the Schneiders argue that 
during economic hard times, social disorder and violence 
usually result from the inability of the political system to 
meet the new demands created by mobilization.9
Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman, the Schneiders regard 
economic development, as well as institutionalization, as an 
intervening variable which interacts with the mobilization 
process. Taken individually, social mobilization, economic 
development, and institutionalization do not reveal an 
important relationship to violence. However, the results 
show that when countries experience low levels of economic 
development in tandem with a high rate of social 
mobilization, which in turn exceeds the ability of the 
regime's political institutions to cope with the increased 
demands, violence usually follows.10
A third study, by Ted Gurr, entitled, "A Causal Model
of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,'*
examines relative deprivation as a cause of political
violence. According to Gurr:
Relative deprivation is the basic precondition 
for civil strife of any kind, and that the more 
widespread and intense deprivation is among 
members of a population, the greater is the 
magnitude of strife in one form or another.11
Deprivation is the discrepancy between value expectations
(the goods and conditions of the life to which people
believe they are justifiably entitled), and value
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capabilities (the amount of those goods and conditions that 
they think they are able to get). The determinants of 
deprivation include sharp increases in peoples' expectations 
resulting from short-term trends in inflation and domestic 
production and persisting inequalities marked by economic 
and political discrimination, political separatism, 
dependence on foreign capital, religious cleavages, and 
finally, lack of educational opportunity.12 What Gurr's 
results indicate is that strife varies directly in magnitude 
and intensity to relative deprivation.13
The common theme among the three studies is that
violence results from dissatisfaction (economic, political,
social, or a combination) among people. The difference
among the authors is how to measure this dissatisfaction and
which component of dissatisfaction is most conducive to
violence. These three works represent only a few of the
efforts to uncover a causal relationship between violence
and various societal conditions. In his book, Mass
Political Violence. Douglas A. Hibbs notes that the
predominant view concerning the causes of violence is:
The process of rapid urbanization in general 
makes for social instability, and that recent 
migrants caught up in this process are 
especially likely to engage in political 
violence.14
A sampling of other works illustrates a number of 
similar opinions. William Kornhauser, in his book, The 
Politics of Mass Society, found that the social disruption
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that accompanies rapid urbanization and industrialization 
"is destabilizing because it uproots and atomizes large 
numbers of people".15 Another author, Pitirim A. Sorokin, 
argues that internal disturbances increase during periods of 
rapid cultural transformation.16 And, Mancur Olson 
maintains that economic downswings, and even upswings, 
produce severe social instability, conflict, and potential 
for revolution.17
One problem confronting studies of this nature is 
quantifying political violence. As Ted Gurr pointed out, 
"there are numerous problems associated with defining 
political violence and the relative scales used to measure 
it."18 For example, difficulties result from 
differentiating between small and large scale civil war or 
organized and unorganized terrorism. Relying on the 
frequency of violent acts may distort the measure of 
violence for countries with small and extremely active 
terrorist groups. Also, qualifying the magnitude of 
violence may result in a biased measure of one particularly 
violent and isolated period.
Douglas Hibbs believes that the qualification of 
violence must meet three criteria. First, it must be anti­
system in character (being at odds with the political 
system). Second, it must have political significance (pose 
a threat or severe inconvenience to the normal operation of 
the political elite). Third, it must be collective "mass"
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activity in which murder, armed robbery or similar criminal 
acts are not counted.19
Hibbs' major complaint concerning the literature in
this field is:
Investigations that have dealt explicitly with 
causal relationships have often done so badly.
Some have employed dubious techniques of 
parameter estimation and causal inference, and 
others are ambiguous about the way the final 
causal structures are derived.20
Hibbs also notes that analyses are often confined to limited
subsamples of the potential data universe and that the use
of a single measure of underdevelopment (as represented in
Flannigan and Fogelman's study) is inappropriate.
Concurring with Hibbs complaint is Leon Hurwitz, who, in his
article, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability,"
maintains the relationship between underdevelopment and
violence is too complex to permit the use of a single aspect
of underdevelopment to be exclusively employed to explain
the incidence of violence.21
Hurwitz would probably defend the approach taken by the 
Schneiders and Gurr, but not Flannigan and Fogelman. 
Flannigan and Fogelman's use of a single measure of 
underdevelopment (percentage of work force engaged in 
agriculture) to explain the occurrence of violence is overly 
simplistic because violence is generally believed to occur 
in response to a combination of many types of 
underdevelopment. Although a single-dimensional measure of 
underdevelopment can usually be quantified, it does not
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satisfy the theoretical requirement which recognizes many 
causes of violence.
A measure that does satisfy this requirement is the 
composite measure. Using a composite measure of 
underdevelopment is "intuitively more acceptable" because it 
incorporates many more social conditions which are thought 
to be linked to violence. However, when using a composite 
measure one must forego precise measurement because many 
social attributes do not easily lend themselves to 
mathematical indicators. Faced with a choice between the 
precision of a single-dimensional measure and the strong 
theoretical basis of a composite measure, Hurwitz contends 
that the suitable approach is the use of the composite 
measure of underdevelopment. Even though this method is not 
responsive to precise quantification, "it does not mean that 
the approach is without merit, however, for it rightfully 
recognizes that the concept of stability cannot be reduced 
to isolated variables."22
This investigation of the literature on cross­
national causal analysis uncovered a number of issues 
concerning the nature of instability, violence, and 
underdevelopment. Perhaps the most apparent is the 
divergence of theories regarding the causes of violence. 
Whereas one study demonstrated economic underdevelopment is 
the leading cause of violence and instability others argued 
that it was social mobilization and relative deprivation.
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A second issue is the debate over the use of single and 
composite measures of underdevelopment. An analysis of the 
relationship between underdevelopment and violence which 
employs a single-dimensional measure of underdevelopment to 
explain the absence or abundance of violence, such as 
Flannigan and Fogelman's use of percentage of work force 
engaged in agriculture, is usually accurate in that it 
generates a high degree of confidence in the statistical 
correlations. Nevertheless, this method cannot be 
considered theoretically valid due to the consensus that 
violence and instability result from a number of complex 
interacting types of underdevelopment— economic, political 
and social. Although the use of a composite measure of 
underdevelopment, like the Schneiders and Gurr study, is 
theoretically valid, it is not statistically accurate. Due 
to the inherent imprecision in quantifying many social 
conditions, such as democracy, institutionalization, and 
deprivation, a lower level of confidence results in the 
statistical correlation between a composite measure of 
underdevelopment and violence. This problem is illustrated 
by the fact that as more social conditions are included in 
the measure of underdevelopment, the less certain 
(statistically) we become of its relationship to violence.
An examination of the definitions of democracy depicts this 
problem by showing the difficulty in quantifying this 
important social condition.
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According to H.B. Mayo, there are so many special and 
personal meanings attached to the word democracy that it is 
difficult to arrive at a operational definition. In 
attempting to set the record straight, Mayo defines 
democracy as
. . . a political system in which public
policies are made on a majority basis by 
representatives subject to effective popular 
control at periodic elections which are 
conducted on the principle of political 
equality and under conditions of political 
freedom.23
Although other authors seem to support this definition, 
there remains, as Mayo points out, substantial differences. 
For example, Giovanni Sartori, in his article "What 
Democracy is Not," defines democracy as a condition where 
"no one can choose himself or invest himself with 
unconditional or unlimited power to rule."24 Another 
definition by Dorothy Pickles notes that genuine democratic 
governments must involve dialogue between different strands 
of opinion, particularly between supporters and opponents of 
the political system.25
These differing interpretations of democracy 
demonstrate the problems facing attempts to discover a 
statistical relationship between democracy and political 
violence. In addition to the absence of a generally 
accepted definition of the concept, inherent difficulties 
exist with quantifying the word. For example, economic 
underdevelopment can easily be represented numerically as
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percentage of work force engaged in agriculture or the 
number of unemployed, the balance of trade deficit, 
recession, or as inflation. However, the "principle of 
political equality," or the "dialogue between differing 
strands of opinion," cannot be represented numerically or 
consistently from one author to another.
Despite the absence of the treatment of communism in 
the discussion of the causes of instability and violence, a 
partial assessment of the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence can be made. Based on the analyses of the origins 
of violence, it cannot be stated with certainly that 
economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause 
instability and violence. Nevertheless, it is generally 
accepted that instability and violence result from a myriad 
of social conditions which have thus far eluded attempts to 
illustrate their specific relationships to instability and 
violence. As a result, the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence can be considered theoretically valid yet 
statistically inaccurate. Because of the inability to 
specify the relationship among the various social conditions 
and their impact upon instability and violence, it is 
impossible to identify which type of underdevelopment is 
more likely to spark violence or to know if all three types 
of underdevelopment are to blame.
In conclusion, the relationships proposed by the theory 
of underdevelopment and violence would seem, based on these
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interpretations, not to provide a foundation for policy. 
Without knowing the type and magnitude of underdevelopment 
that will cause violence, policymakers cannot establish a 
cause and effect relationship that will allow them to 
develop plans of action with definite goals. For example, 
if it were true that a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would 
bring about a corresponding drop in violence, then 
policymakers could then set their goal at a 2.5 percent 
increase in GNP. However, without knowledge of the true 
relationships between conditions of underdevelopment and 
violence the goal of a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would be 
meaningless. Therefore, the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge 
except for the very general idea that various kinds of 
underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the 
occurrence of violence.
The following chapter will examine the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence by looking at its practical 
application during the Alliance for Progress.
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CHAPTER III
The conclusions drawn from the review of the literature 
on cross-national causal analysis indicated that the theory 
of underdevelopment and violence is theoretically valid yet 
statistically inaccurate. Because of its statistical 
inaccuracy, questions remain as to whether certain 
relationships proposed by the theory truly exist. This 
chapter will attempt to appraise the success of the theory 
of underdevelopment and violence by observing its 
application as the basis of U.S. foreign policy during the 
Alliance for Progress.
This evaluation of the theory in the context of the 
Alliance for Progress depends on the perspective one adopts 
toward the Alliance itself. The three perspectives on the 
Alliance outlined by Abraham F. Lowenthal form the core of 
this examination.1 Each of the three perspectives views the 
inspiration, implementation, and outcome of the Alliance 
differently. While the "liberal" perspective follows an 
historical development of U.S. policy, the "radical" 
perspective examines the nature of U.S.-Latin American 
relations, and the "bureaucratic" perspective focuses on the 
foreign policy process as a key to understanding the
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Alliance.
PART I : THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE
Liberal theory, according to Lowenthal, assumes that a
shared interest in hemispheric development exists between
the United States and Latin America, and that past
imperialistic policies such as "Gunboat" or "Dollar
Diplomacy" are non-recurrent.2 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy is cited as pioneering
this relationship. According to Lloyd Mecham, in A Survey
of Untied States Latin America Relations:
This new policy meant that [United States] 
interposition to protect private property might 
not be undertaken if it clashed with broader 
national policies. American citizens could no 
longer accept as a matter of course that they 
had the right to call for the troops or 
diplomatic interposition whenever or whatever 
danger appeared.*5
Although military options waned, the U.S. "continued to
employ the customary methods of diplomacy," such as
financial inducements, protests, and economic measures "to
create positive collaboration among the American states."4
However, liberals conclude that Washington's reluctance to
"send in the Marines" clearly signaled that the link between
military protection of U.S. investments and national
security was broken.5
Whatever goals Roosevelt had in mind for Latin America 
were overshadowed at the end of World War II? Europe and the
46
Marshall Plan dominated North American foreign policy.6 
Liberals agree that Washington's strategic concerns in the 
early postwar period focused primarily on Soviet 
confrontation in Europe and containment in Korea, and paid 
insufficient attention to Latin American problems and 
issues. As Washington turned its attention to the cold war, 
"Latin Americans watched with growing resentment the 
outpouring of U.S. assistance to Europe and Asia while their 
own requests for assistance were being rejected."^
It was not until the late 1950s that Latin America once 
again became the focus of U.S. attention. The angry mobs 
that greeted Richard Nixon on his tour of Latin America in 
1958 and Castro's success in Cuba brought to the forefront 
of U.S. awareness growing anti-Americanism, communism, 
underdevelopment, and the resulting threat to U.S. security 
in the hemisphere.
In an attempt to address the mounting crisis in Latin 
America, the Alliance for Progress was conceived, according 
to the liberal perspective, as a "genuine U.S. government 
commitment to cooperate with Latin American countries."8 
Whereas U.S. interests were obvious considerations, it was 
believed that Washington's concerns were also compatible 
with, and largely dependent upon, social and economic 
progress in Latin America.9 Furthermore, liberal writers 
maintain that "the Alliance represented a democratic 
alternative to Cuba's revolutionary socialist formula for
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development."10 Linking the conditions of economic, 
political, and social underdevelopment with increased 
instability and unrest, Washington suddenly became aware 
that "the spread of communism to the Western Hemisphere, a 
possibility long feared by the United States, had become a 
reality."11 What Washington hoped for was that the Alliance 
would enable politically moderate elements to bring about 
economic development and fundamental social change within 
the framework of representative political institutions and 
thus preempt the revolutionary forces of the left.12
Liberal accounts of the Alliance's performance differ, 
but all seem to agree that U.S. actions, initially 
benevolent, succumbed to unfortunate occurrences, were 
handicapped by uncontrollable forces, and lacked necessary 
understanding of Latin American politics. Other reasons for 
its lack of success include the death of it most ardent 
supporter, John F. Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso's replacement as 
Alliance coordinator and half-hearted implementation. 
Finally, North Americans' penchant for quick results led 
Washington officials to seek an immediate political impact 
of a long-term program.
George C. Lodge, in his book Engines of Change, 
observed that a major stumbling block to creating a truly 
multilateral program was United States dominance. What was 
originally designed to be an inter-American program of 
mutual coordination and implementation, became by "default"
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a program of bilateral rather than multilateral relations. 
Failure can also be attributed to Washington's belief that 
Latin American governments had the will and capacity to 
enact the sweeping economic, political, and social reforms 
envisioned by the Alliance's founders. The truth was that 
many governments were restricted on both accounts. As Lodge 
notes:
This restriction derives from two 
characteristics of such societies: A majority
of the people exist outside any significant 
relationship to the government, beyond 
jurisdiction, reach or interest; and government 
tends to be the creature of oligarchic power- 
holders whose controlling interest is in 
maintaining the status quo.13
The list of failures and problems identified by the 
liberal writers is extensive. One that merits further 
investigation is the role of Latin America's middle class. 
Lowenthal proposes that liberal writers, along with the 
founders of the Alliance, assumed that conditions and 
developments in Latin America had led to the beginnings of a 
politically important middle class. At the time of the 
conception of the Alliance, there was a growing belief among 
U.S. policymakers that the swelling middle class of Latin 
America would someday replace the traditional oligarchic 
ruling process by one of debate and compromise among 
conflicting interest groups not unlike the United States 
political process.14 However, as many liberal writers 
concluded, the middle class did not evolve or act as 
predicted.
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Considered a great influence during the Alliance's 
beginnings is John J. Johnson's book, Political Change in 
Latin America: The Growth of The Middle Sectors. Johnson 
argued that Latin America's middle class economic, 
political, and social strength would grow rather than 
decline in the decade of the 1960s and that the art of 
compromise, unknown or disaffected in the past, has been 
elevated to a new level which asserts to balance political 
antagonisms.15 Identified as "stabilizers" or 
"harmonizers," the middle class was considered the very 
force which would ensure the success of the Alliance. Due 
to its non-homogeneous structure, the middle class 
represented a modernizing element, according to Johnson, 
devoted to a wide range of aims such as public education, 
industrialization, economic growth, and social welfare.16
With its roots firmly planted in industrialization and 
urbanization, the middle class was judged committed to 
maintaining open avenues for socio-economic mobility. As 
these opportunities are unlocked and used, more individuals 
are assimilated into the middle class structure of society 
and as a result, come to perpetuate and expand these 
approaches of mobility and thus the impetus of that 
mobility— industrialization.17
In their pursuit of economic, political, and social 
equality, the middle class comes into conflict with the 
"patronage" system of the ruling elite. The ensuing
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struggle finds the middle class allied with the lower class 
and even "advocating the admission of these classes to the 
body politic and their more active participation in the 
social and economic advantages."18 Rather than a marriage 
of convenience, the two groups subscribe to the goal of an 
open society with enforced standards of equal participation. 
The needs of the middle class require an alliance with the 
lower classes to face the traditional elite and to maintain 
or increase avenues for their own mobility and in turn the 
lower classes, "thus making it a willing instrument in the 
transformation of social and economic institutions."19
In Louis Ratinoff's work, The New Urban Groups: The 
Middle Classes. Johnson's theory is cited as the customary 
theory . The alternate view contrasts sharply with its 
rival. Basic to this approach is the assumption that the 
middle class, "in some circumstances, represents a force 
committed to maintaining the traditional social system."20 
Although there are means for economic, political, and social 
mobility, they are restricted by norms imposed by the 
traditional elite. This is characterized as a system of 
patronage rather than merit . Newly arriving middle 
class individuals become socialized by the traditional norms 
of patronage and ultimately come to perpetuate them. As for 
the middle class's aspirations for maintaining open avenues 
of mobility and allying themselves with the lower classes, 
Ratinoff notes that it is
. . . dependent upon the system's ability
to satisfy the middle classes' minimum 
aspirations. If the system provides a 
reasonable degree of satisfaction for such 
aspirations, the middle classes tend to model 
their behavior and standards on those of the 
traditional social elite.21
If the system does not provide these minimum requirements,
the middle class collides with the traditional elite "often
embracing populist ideologies built on social justice and a
sense of freedom."22 However, the reality in Latin America
indicated that although "the middle class, in their rise to
power, introduce all kinds on innovations, they did not
commit themselves to the establishment of social order based
on middle class values."23 Ratinoff concludes:
Middle class policies simply preserved the 
established positions and recognized poverty as 
a fact of the social system. The impulse 
toward a better distribution of power, 
prestige, and wealth steadily declined in 
importance, and the middle sectors showed more 
interest in securing for themselves the 
advantages of the desired status, in a social 
organization where the presence of poverty has 
heightened the privileges of the groups in 
power.24
Concurring with this line of thought is Victor Alba, 
who in his book Alliance Without Allies, discredits the idea 
that the middle class of Latin America was a modernizing 
force dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.
In examining the "myth" of the middle class desire for 
economic, political, and social advancement, Alba concludes 
that the middle class rejected change and thus served only 
to satisfy their own needs and those of the traditional
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ruling elite.25
In another analysis of the middle class of Latin 
America, Jo£e Nun set out to dispel the popular belief that 
the military was primarily a tool of the oligarchy used to 
suppress the desires of the middle and lower classes. Nun 
proposes that the Latin American military, because of its 
predominantly middle class make up, more often comes to the 
defense of the middle class who are committed to maintaining 
their position in society. According to Nun, most military 
officers come from urban middle class backgrounds which form 
the basis of much of the military's political convictions.25 
These opinions on the economic, political, and social 
direction of the country manifest themselves when 
confrontation appears between the lower class desire for 
reform and the elite's desire to maintain the status quo. 
Reacting out of fear that the confrontation may push the 
oligarchy towards repression and the lower classes toward 
revolution, the middle class relies on the armed forces to 
keep either group from going too far.27
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the liberal 
perspective of the Alliance for Progress. But perhaps the 
most important is that, if the liberal perspective is 
correct, policymakers lacked a clear understanding of the 
socio-political dynamics of Latin American societies. The 
architects of the Alliance believed that the growing middle 
class of Latin America, like their counterparts in the
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United States, were devoted to economic prosperity, social 
equality, and political democratization. These very same 
conditions, if nurtured and allowed to flourish, would bring 
about enhanced security for the U.S. by diminishing 
instability, violence, and the threat of communist 
encroachment in Latin America. Nevertheless, experience 
illustrated that these middle class groups did not act as 
predicted and in many cases helped to perpetuate the 
continuing cycle of underdevelopment and violence.
In conclusion, the application of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for 
progress, according to the liberal perspective, was a 
failure due to the incorrect assumption that the middle 
class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry 
out development programs.
Although the theory of underdevelopment and violence, 
as it was illustrated in chapter one of this paper, did not 
discuss the role of Latin America's middle class, the 
theory's call for economic liberalization, political 
democratization, and social reform certainly reflects middle 
class values and desires. This point is illuminated by 
liberal writers who indicated that policymakers during the 
Alliance believed Latin America's middle class was evolving 
much like the middle class in the United States.
Therefore, from this assumption, it seems evident that 
the theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived
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and implemented exclusively from the perspective of U.S. 
middle class values and desires— not Latin American. The 
cause of the Alliance's problems may be attributed to the 
attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the completely 
different middle class values in Latin America. As a 
result, the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for 
Progress resulted not as much from the assumption that 
underdevelopment caused violence, but that the remedy for 
overcoming violence through the extension of development 
assistance, which reflected U.S. middle class values, would 
not apply in countries that had completely different middle 
class values.
The liberal perspective provides one viewpoint for 
assessing the Alliance for Progress and the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence. The following section will 
examine an alternative approach called the radical 
perspective.
PART II: THE RADICAL PERSPECTIVE
The "radical" perspective characteristically includes 
one theme: United States foreign policies serve primarily 
the expansive interests of North American capitalism. What 
liberals regard as a compatibility of interests, radicals 
see as a conflict between the United States' urge to 
dominate and Latin Americas' desire to be sovereign. Big 
business dictates policy, and Washington, always eager to 
support these interests, accommodates businesses through its 
foreign policy.
The radical perspective represents an amalgamation of 
theories grounded on Marxist-Leninist analysis of 
capitalism, dependency, modes of production, imperialism, 
and revolution. A common perception among radicals is that 
U.S. suspicion and fear of Latin America is generated by the 
perceived threat of communism, nationalism, and revolution 
to U.S. corporate and strategic concerns.
Rejecting the notion that U.S. imperialism occurred 
only during overt military intervention, as liberal theory 
suggests, the radical perspective views imperialism as a 
"multi-dimensional concept" whose components are in 
persistent interplay. James Petras notes, in his book
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Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, that to 
consider imperialism solely in economic or military terms is 
nonsense. Imperialism is carried out through all levels of 
contact. "Even voluntary student and intellectual 
associations are used by the U.S. government to transmit 
values among the educated classes of the third world to 
facilitate the acceptance of U.S. economic penetration.m1
While liberals regarded the Good Neighbor policy as an 
improvement in U.S.-Latin American relations, radicals see 
it as a continuation of U.S. dominance of Latin America. 
David Green's analysis of the Good Neighbor policy, in The 
Containment of Latin America, suggests that U.S. policy was 
based on containing Latin American nationalism because of 
its threat to U.S. business and strategic concerns.2 For 
example, Green argues that the 1938 expropriation of U.S. 
oil interests by Mexico would have prompted considerable 
effort by United States policymakers to head off the spread 
of nationalism in Latin America if not for the advent of 
World War II.3
A dominant radical characterization of the nature of 
U.S.-Latin American relations draws from dependency theory. 
According to Dale Johnson, in his article "Dependency and 
The International System," dependency occurs when one or 
more countries' economies are "conditioned" by the expansion 
of another dominant country. This relationship assumes 
dependency when the dependent country can develop
(economically) only as a reflection of the dominant 
country's economic expansion. Linked in part to Latin 
America's colonial experience, dependency encompasses 
reliance upon one or two exports (usually cash-crop 
agriculture), need for foreign capital, and foreign 
ownership of important economic sectors. Johnson concludes 
that this relationship results from and is perpetuated by 
the imperatives generated in the structure and functioning 
of the U.S. economic system.4
Radicals argue that one of the many components of 
dependency, foreign investment, has been integrated into 
vital sectors of Latin America economies (industry, 
services, agriculture, and consumer goods) at such an 
alarming rate that it has come to determine and influence 
many countries' manner of economic development. According 
to Teotonio dos Santos, in his article "The Changing 
Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin America," the roots 
of this present crisis can be traced back to
industrialization. Because of insufficient domestic capital 
and investment needed to sustain economic development, Latin 
America turned toward foreign money. As foreign investment 
began to switch from the "colonial exporting enclave" 
(agriculture and mining) to the manufacturing sector, more 
corporations became "affiliated" with North America and 
European firms, allowed secured monopolies over key markets, 
and thus furthered dependence on foreign imports and created
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a financial dependence on much needed foreign capital.5 
Santos concludes that "there is growing contradiction 
between the control exercised by foreign capital over the 
economy and the technical capacity of the [Latin American] 
economy to support itself."6
Latin America's response to these conditions was mixed. 
In many countries the backlash of anti-Americanism generated 
by the policies of multinationals and the U.S. government 
has led to expropriation and nationalization of U.S. 
businesses, as well as attempts to break away from reliance 
on U.S. manufactured and imported products. Even under 
conditions of import substitution, in which countries 
establish industries designed to compete with and eventually 
overtake foreign imported goods, Latin America still must 
rely on the importation of raw materials, intermediate 
parts, and the machinery and equipment necessary to 
establish production.7 Compounding Latin America's 
difficulties is the lack of export markets, a condition 
often attributed to the barriers imposed by developed 
countries to protect their own businesses. In Latin 
America, concludes Dale Johnson, "there is little 
expectation that significant markets can be found for 
exports of manufactured products that might loosen 
dependence upon primary exports."6
The radical view of the Alliance for Progress follow 
from their use of dependency theory. What liberal accounts
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describe as a genuine program of economic, social, and 
political development, radicals see a "sophisticated 
instrument" to advance U.S. private economic interests. 
Characterized as a program for the protection of 
investments, earnings, and new profit making opportunities, 
radicals argue that the Alliance "amounted in short to a 
government administered welfare program for U.S. 
investors."9
To the radical view, the rhetoric surrounding the 
Alliance for Progress was just that, rhetoric. Reforms and 
other goals proclaimed by the Alliance "fundamentally 
conflicted with U.S. corporate interests and the U.S. 
corporate system in Latin America."10 David Horowitz, in 
his book Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of 
Contemporary History, comments that Washington "openly 
abandoned" the idea of encouraging development in Latin 
America. Instead, it became an "imperial guardian of a 
prototype neo-colonial system" in which its instrument of 
subjugation was the Alliance for Progress.11
With a similar interpretation, Simon Hanson, in his 
book Dollar Diplomacy Modern Stvle. suggests that the 
Alliance marked the revival of an old policy. Hanson 
theorizes that "during the decade of the Alliance for 
Progress dollar diplomacy was revived with a scope that 
dwarfed the earlier episodes."1  ^ It was a "new era" where 
U.S. interests and property were protected by intervention
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so great that "the American Ambassador had indeed become not 
the second most important man, but actually the most 
important man in the country, the man to see, as far as 
public policy goes."13 Also termed "welfare diplomacy," the 
Alliance represented a pursuit of U.S. interests in which 
the primary instrument of policy was money, and the central 
tenet of policy was that money could solve any problem.14
According to this line of reasoning, the Alliance
worked on two fronts. First, it represented a subsidy for
U.S. overseas investments, and second, it used economic
assistance to pressure and influence Latin American
governments. In the case of influence turned outright
threat of sanction, Hanson points to U.S. dealings with
Argentina. It was speculated that Argentina was influenced,
during the early years of the Alliance, into making bad
deals with U.S. oil companies. Inevitably Argentine
reaction was unfavorable to what Hanson describes as
"foisted" business deals. The outpouring of Argentine
support to renege on the contracts forced a U.S. response.
Hanson recalls that
The White House rushed in to warn Argentina 
that anything done to [change the] 
relationships with the oil companies...would 
meet instant reprisal in terms of aid from the 
United States.1*
The short and long-term benefits of the Alliance were 
limited to a few corporations. The cost fell directly on 
the U.S. taxpayer. Eliminating investment risks by shifting
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those risks to the taxpayer was central to the Alliance.
The U.S. citizen was unaware that "the evacuation of
unprofitable investments by private corporations was an
objective of the Alliance."16 While liberals believed that
a separation of national and private interests had been
achieved, Hanson proposes that "the corporate interest would
be attached to the national interest, and in a choice given
priority over the national interest."17 Though the Alliance
was designed to benefit U.S. interests by promoting
corporate interests, it failed to do so. Hanson concludes:
What happened in the decade of the Alliance 
was that U.S. bureaucrats had come to 
realize, if not admit, that the thesis of 
dollar diplomacy modern style had proven to 
be a failure. It was impossible to install 
democratic governments by selective 
donations. It was impossible to defend 
private investments by selective allocations 
of donations and indeed the device had 
proved counter-productive by providing an 
alternative to provision of a suitable 
climate of investment.18
As a result, the Alliance could no longer be justified to
the American public. According to Hanson, its fruitless
drain on the U.S. taxpayer could not be concealed in light
of the lack of progress. By 1970 the Alliance died quietly,
its programs and what little funds were available where
transferred to other inter-American agencies.
The radical's analysis of the success of the Alliance 
for Progress rests upon the supposition that the very nature 
of U.S. involvement in Latin America is exploitive. In the 
radical view the Alliance for Progress was never intended to
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benefit Latin America. Its purpose was to subsidize U.S. 
foreign investors. Its aim also included protecting U.S. 
overseas businesses by withholding or releasing Alliance 
funds to Latin American governments.
In conclusion, the radical perspective represents the 
view that U.S. interests, however cleverly disguised, are 
not reflected by the theory of underdevelopment and violence 
as it was explained in chapter one of this paper or by the 
liberal perspective's account of the Alliance for Progress. 
However, if we overlook the radical assumption that U.S. 
policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S. 
businesses, insight can be gained as to the viability of the 
theory of underdevelopment and violence.
Considering that U.S. business interests are not 
necessarily paramount to U.S. foreign policy, but do 
represent an important force, the value of the radical view 
emerges in its recognition that these interests did not 
coincide with the theory behind the Alliance. Whether at 
its outset or somewhere in the process, business interests 
were clearly important considerations during the Alliance 
for Progress. What the radical perspective provides is the 
recognition that U.S. foreign policy is affected by business 
interests and that these interests are not necessarily 
devoted to economic, political, and social development in 
Latin America.
The following section examines the "bureaucratic11
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perspective. The bureaucratic analysis focuses on the 
foreign policy process. This view provides further evidence 
that interests, other than those loyal to economic, 
political, and social development in Latin America, can 
manipulate policy to their own views.
PART III: THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE
Unlike the liberal and radical perspectives, the 
"bureaucratic" perspective analyzes foreign policy by 
determining the roles of the participants and their effect 
on the creation and implementation of policy. To the 
bureaucratic perspective, foreign policy, like domestic 
policy, represents the culmination of efforts of individuals 
and organizations, inside and outside government, to express 
their interests and have them incorporated in policy 
choices. The interaction of these participants entails a 
"series of overlapping and inter-locking bargaining 
processes."1 Therefore, knowledge of the interworkings of 
this process— who the players were, what their concerns and 
roles were, and where the interaction was located— will lead 
to a better understanding of the outcome of U.S. foreign 
policy.
The pioneer of this approach, Graham T. Allison, 
rejected the traditional single actor model as a 
comprehensive approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy 
in favor of the organizational and bargaining models.
Allison suggests that treating governments as purposive 
individuals obscures the influence of others. According to
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Allison, "the maker of government policy is not one 
calculating individual but rather a conglomerate of large 
organizations and political actors.1'2
Due to the United States' expanded role in world 
affairs after World War II, numerous organizations and 
individuals began, and succeeded in, challenging the State 
Department's monopoly in foreign affairs.3 As a result, 
various interests came to exert influence in the formation 
and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Even within the 
government itself, countless agencies labored to ensure that 
their views and interests were represented.
Next to the executive branch, the most visibly 
influential organization within government is Congress.
With its constitutionally vested powers, such as 
appropriation of funds, ratification of treaties, and 
limited control over the use of the military, Congress 
naturally inspires the formation and execution of foreign 
policy.4 However, there are government organizations that 
possess equally effective powers to influence the direction 
of U.S. foreign policy.
The agencies and departments of what is referred to as 
the intelligence community are charged with collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of critical knowledge that forms 
the basis of most foreign policy decisions. The opportunity 
to weight and bias this information is clearly present but, 
as Allison points out, this may not be the case due to a
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central characteristic. Like most government bureaucracies, 
the intelligence community "functions less as integral parts 
of a unitary head that entertains preconceptions and 
theories than as organs that perform their tasks in a 
habitual fashion."5 Although an established routine 
furnishes guidelines that allows agencies and departments to
function in a coherent fashion, it can also inhibit the
(
execution of policy once those guidelines are by-passed.
For example, when organizations are confronted with a 
foreign policy that is not completely understood or lacks 
clearly defined procedures, "their performance is likely to 
appear sluggish and inappropriate to external critics, and 
their patterns of behavior are likely to seem encrusted and 
incapable of change to outsiders."6
Another characteristic of governmental organizations is 
a will to maintain some measure of independent action and to 
expand its area of responsibility.7 In this respect, 
organizations are both imperialistic and self-serving. To 
maintain their semi-sovereignty, agencies and departments 
must justify appropriation requests while fending off 
attempts to reduce their budget. Consequently, competition 
arises among organizations over the inability to define 
organizational jurisdiction of many tasks, which usually 
results in one agency being pitted against another over the 
responsibility of doing a job. How does this affect foreign 
policy? A clear example provided by Graham Allison recounts
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the ten day delay in getting U-2 reconnaissance photos of 
Cuban missile bases to President Kennedy because of a 
jurisdictional dispute between the Air Force and the CIA 
over who would conduct the U-2 mission.8
Foreign policies regularly affect private 
organizations. They, in turn, try to ensure that policies 
are favorable by "bringing a wide variety of aims and 
perspectives to bear with differing degrees of effectiveness 
at various points in the policy-making process."9 An 
example of this would be the effects of both domestic and 
international business organizations. At times businesses 
within the United States have attempted to persuade the 
government to restrict, through tariffs for example, a 
foreign competitor; international businesses may attempt to 
convince the government to protect their overseas holdings 
and investments from expropriation, nationalization, and 
burdensome taxes. In this sense foreign policies can 
reflect an organization's need for government cooperation 
and also how effectively organizations tie their interests 
to national politics. However, the U.S. government often 
requires the cooperation of these same organizations in 
order to implement foreign policy. An extreme example would 
be economic boycott or disinvestment, another more subtle 
from would be the promotion, through tax incentives, of 
private investment in foreign countries to augment the U.S. 
government's foreign economic policies. In the case of the
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Alliance and the Commission Report, both called for 
increased private investment to aid economic development in 
Latin America. As the business-government relationship 
becomes apparent, it is evident that business interests 
often fulfill important roles in the creation and 
implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
Individuals also may be important actors in U.S. 
foreign policy. Those who seem to exert the most influence 
are usually leaders of organizations inside and outside the 
government. Clearly, financial and political strength is 
decisive but equally important is how a leader's personal 
traits— honesty, integrity, and credibility— are perceived 
by others. Congressmen, religious leaders, business 
executives and agency directors, for example, work to shape 
and mold government behavior through a series of bargaining 
games .10 These individuals seek to promote their interests 
which are molded by their perceptions of national security, 
their organization, and their domestic and personal 
concerns.
Because the bureaucratic perspective focuses on the 
creation and implementation of policy, an analysis of the 
Alliance for Progress must begin with an investigation of 
the individuals responsible for its creation. The 
architects of the Alliance were principally scholars and 
Latin America specialists eager to employ the comprehensive 
plans of the Kennedy administration. According to
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Lowenthal, they were attentive to Latin American views, and 
committed to inter-American cooperation.12 Latin American 
specialists Douglas Dillon and R. R. Rubottum directed much 
of the negotiating and fact finding for the Alliance.13 
Dillon was U.S. representative at the signing of the 
Alliance Charter, at Punta del Este, and was later 
criticized for committing the U.S. to a multimillion dollar 
program without Congressional approval. Presidential 
assistant Adolf Berle, "the man who provided the link 
between the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for 
Progress," was also responsible for Latin American and 
Caribbean leaders' access to Kennedy in the policy formation 
process.14 The Latin American Task Force, which provided 
the foundation of the Alliance, consisted of Berle, Teodoro 
Moscoso, Morales Carrion, Robert Goodwin, and three U.S. 
professors (Lincoln Gordon, Robert Alexander, and Arthur 
Whitacker). The engineers of the Alliance were a small 
inner circle of Latin American specialists mainly from 
academia; they were not dominated by business interests. On 
the contrary, most of Kennedy's appointments reflected the 
exclusion of many traditional foreign policy players, the 
business community among them. Of Kennedy's first 200 
appointments, 6 percent were from business and 18 percent 
from universities, compared to 36 percent and 6 percent 
respectively during the Eisenhower administration.15
In addition to the exclusion of many traditional
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participants from the policy formation process, the crisis 
tone of the administration's appraisal of Latin America 
further confined the creation of policy to a small group. 
This feeling of urgency in the Kennedy administration's 
arguments for Latin American assistance was recorded by 
Arthur Schlesinger. According to Schlesinger "the old order 
in Latin America was breaking up. There was no longer any 
question of preserving the status quo."18
Writers who assume the bureaucratic perspective argue 
that the administration presented the Alliance as a certain 
cure for an inevitable crisis. Just as a domestic crisis 
mobilizes public, congressional, and bureaucratic support 
for the President, the same can be said of foreign policy. 
Stanley Hoffman, in Gulliver's Travels, or the Setting of 
American Foreign Policy, argues that the policy making 
process is "normally" an ordeal with infighting reaching 
vast proportions. However, "a crisis abroad acts like a 
truce at home and makes it easier to restrict policymaking 
to a small inner circle."17 Although crisis decisions often 
lead to improvised and abrupt resolutions based on unsteady 
compromises resulting in short-term rather than long-term 
solutions, when disaster is imminent, remarks Hoffman,
"there may not be time to integrate the different services 
and their varying frames of analysis before acting."18
While the formation of the Alliance for Progress 
appeared to be restricted to a small group, it clearly
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became evident that its implementation would not. The 
groups and individuals assigned to administer the Alliance 
programs were probably the first to regain some measure of 
influence over its direction. Christopher Mitchell, in 
"Dominance and Fragmentation of U.S Latin American Policy," 
portrays the reintroduction of these groups as the outcome 
of a Presidential resolve inadequate to withstand the 
fragmentary political pressures. As a result, "diplomats, 
military men, and private pressure groups, (especially 
investors and exporters), all pressured for and regained 
considerable margin for independent action."1  ^ Concurring 
with this appraisal, Robert Wagner commented that the 
process by which Latin American policies were implemented 
during the Alliance, "seems to have been characterized by 
the same fragmentation of power and difficulty of achieving 
a set of political goals insulated from the demands of 
private pressure groups that characterize the rest of 
American politics."2  ^ Two groups, whose influence grew 
during the Alliance— private businesses and governmental 
organizations— had a substantial impact upon the execution 
of policy.
The Alliance lasted ten years, and drew a myriad 
competitors into the policy process. They could be observed 
each year as the Alliance budget request came before 
Congress. The Congress made certain that interests outside 
those responsible for the initial creation of the Alliance
72
had at least a chance to air their views.21 Although 
briefly mentioned in the Charter of Punta del Este, and 
seemingly left out of the policy formation process, 
businesses became influential in the implementation of the 
Alliance's programs.22 The Inter-American Development Bank, 
along with other international and domestic lending 
institutions, private investors and international 
corporations, not only joined government efforts to 
revitalize Latin American economies, but made certain their 
views and interests were represented.23
An example of their impact was the Hickenlooper 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, which 
according to Levinson and DeOnis, "marked the reintroduction 
of business interests in foreign policy and effectively tied 
the foreign assistance programs of the Alliance to the 
protection of overseas investment."24 The amendment 
compelled the President to suspend economic aid to any 
country that expropriated the property of a U.S. company, 
repudiated a contract with a U.S. company, or made a U.S. 
company subject to discriminatory taxation or 
administration.2 5
Another illustration of the influence business was able 
to wield emerged from a dispute between the government of 
Peru and the International Petroleum Company (IPC). 
Nationalistic pressures within Peru prompted an attempt to 
nationalize the country's oil deposits which were owned by
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IPC— a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Washington's response was a temporary freeze, (lasting 
almost two years), on assistance to Peru— an indication that 
Washington was strongly influenced by IPC and Standard Oil 
of New Jersey.26 A further demonstration of Standard Oil's 
leverage was the apparent disregard to include the State 
Department in negotiations between IPC and Peru.27
In addition to businesses, various agencies and 
departments which were initially left out of the creation of 
the Alliance, but charged with administering its assistance 
programs, were able to alter policy greatly. One agency in 
particular, the Agency for International Development (AID), 
which processed loan applications, engineered development 
programs, and finally audited those programs, had a great 
influence on policy.
The procedures which AID established to distribute 
assistance often became a hinderance to the smooth operation 
of the Alliance. Compounding the complex and cumbersome 
array of guidelines for filing loan applications was the 
fact that many Latin American countries were ill-equipped to 
submit detailed and comprehensive requests and unable to 
distribute funds effectively. As a result, AID's loan staff 
officers would often encounter delays authorizing and 
allocating assistance funds due to the obstacles of getting 
Latin American foreign ministers to sign authorizations. The 
delays were frequently ascribed to difficulty in translating
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important clauses, and lack of a full-time legal staff.28
Although administrative procedures could be refined and 
improved, AID was besieged by interest groups, who, out of 
fear of the growing leftist and communist influences in 
Latin America, pressured for a re-defining of Alliance 
goals. AID field officers, representing in-country Latin 
American development and reform interests, and AID officials 
in Washington, representing lobbyists, Congressmen, and 
other agencies and departments, became embroiled in a 
political battle over the direction of Alliance goals; the 
AID field officers ultimately lost.2  ^ The outcome of this 
reinterpretation of the Alliance's emphasis resulted in 
adopting quick-fix anti-communist programs rather than long­
term economic, political, and social reforms. According to 
Washington AID representative, Philip Golden, there were 
three types of Latin American assistance, "very high 
priority, hysterical, and if-we-don't-make-this-loan-the- 
communists-will-take-over-the-country."30 The effect of 
this strategy— attempting to counteract leftist influence—  
led agencies such as AID to seek projects which would 
eagerly be accepted by Latin American governments, 
implemented rapidly, concretely obvious to the local people, 
and decidedly short-term in nature.31
Riordan Roett's analysis of Alliance programs in 
Northeast Brazil concluded that the emphasis on combating 
leftist influences with short-term remedies rather than
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long-term economic, political, and social development 
programs encouraged U.S. agencies to bypass local 
development coalitions and become embroiled in political 
infighting among state and national levels of Latin American 
governments. AID'S involvement with Brazil's 
Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast 
(SUDENE) not only highlights the suspicions held by AID 
officials of communist influences in local coalitions, but 
the overall politicalization of Alliance efforts in 
Brazil.32
Through the dedicated leadership of Celso Furtado and 
the administrative ingenuity of SUDENE, an innovative plan 
for economic, political, and social reform in Brazil's 
Northeast region was formulated. With Furtado's personal 
reception by President Kennedy and the apparent support of 
the plan by AID's Northeast Survey Team, the stage seemed 
set for the implementation of Alliance programs. However, 
AID officials in Washington, believing that SUDENE had been 
infiltrated by communist elements and its staff was 
attempting to challenge the traditional political power- 
holders, felt that SUDENE should be excluded from overseeing 
the assistance program.33 Another reason for SUDENE's 
diminished role was AID's desire to circumvent SUDENE's 
perceived efforts to undermine the political power and 
support for Governor Alves of the Brazilian state of Rio 
Grande do Norte, who was being challenged by leftist
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elements and the development coalition organized by SUDENE. 
Once given the go ahead by AID representatives in 
Washington, Alves established his own development staff, 
independent of SUDENE, to execute the program. A further 
hobbling of SUDENE's role came about when Brazilian 
President Joao Goulart, needing Alves' political support, 
allowed the program to proceed without SUDENE's approval or 
supervision, thereby delegating authority to AID and ALVES' 
staff. The results of this program allowed Alves to spurn 
state development programs, escape SUDENE supervision, 
fortify his own political position, and release state funds, 
that would have otherwise gone into a development program, 
for Alves' political activities.34 Roett concludes that the 
over-all impact of U.S. aid in Northeast Brazil counteracted 
Brazil's modernization efforts in that area.35
In conclusion, the bureaucratic perspective presents a 
critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of 
the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who 
create, influence, and implement foreign policy. Writers 
who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the 
Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional 
setting were the normal foreign policy participants were 
excluded. Based on the crisis tone of the administration's 
appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to 
restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of 
advisors, those organizations and individuals responsible
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for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its 
creation, but however, were able to gain considerable 
influence over its direction once the programs were put into 
action.
Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the 
direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the 
Agency for International Development. The successful 
reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the 
passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The resurgence of 
AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over 
the desire to counter communist influence with short-term 
highly visible programs rather than the more long-term 
development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's 
founders.
The influence of businesses relates to the belief that 
the Alliance proposed greater Latin American economic 
development and self-sufficiency. From a Latin American 
perspective, the United States seemed prepared to relinquish 
its control over national means of production— the oil 
deposits in Peru, for example. However, what the creators 
of the Alliance envisioned did not correspond to the desires 
of those businesses which held interests in or controlled 
the national production capabilities of Latin American 
nations. Once Latin American countries sought to gain 
control of these foreign owned means of production, U.S. 
businesses pressured for and were able to block many Latin
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American attempts to expropriate and nationalize U.S. held 
business interests.
The influence of the Agency for International 
Development can be traced to the determination that Latin 
American societies faced immediate threat from communist 
forces. In response to this, AID was able to reorient the 
thrust of Alliance programs away from long-term economic, 
political, and social reforms toward short-term highly 
visible anti-communist programs.
The influence of AID was also linked to the belief that 
Latin American governments must initiate democratic reforms. 
The very basis of the Alliance itself— increasing the 
participation and political influence of non-traditional 
political players in the nation's economic, political, and 
social development— could not be balanced with the fact that 
U.S. assistance was funneled through the very same political 
forces that were committed to maintaining the traditional 
political system. In the Case of Brazil, AID's efforts to 
initiate development plans and increase democratic political 
participation, threatened to diffuse the political power 
base of the groups with which AID had to work to institute 
these development plans. As a result, Alliance efforts 
became tethered to various political struggles between Latin 
American power holders and newly emerging groups that the 
Alliance was originally designed to bring about.
The bureaucratic perspective outlines one aspect of the
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Alliance for Progress which is useful in evaluating the 
theory of underdevelopment and violence. In the concluding 
chapter which follows, lessons learned from the three 
perspectives of the Alliance for Progress as well as the 
analysis of the theoretical foundations of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence will be gathered together in 
order evaluate the theory's viability as a basis for United 
States foreign policy.
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CONCLUSION
Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and 
the success of its application during the Alliance for 
Progress, this thesis asks whether the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation 
for United States foreign policy. The methods employed to 
answer this question were utilized in three chapters.
Chapter one uncovered the concepts of the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence. Chapter two established the 
validity and accuracy of the theory and chapter three 
assessed, with the aid of three different perspectives, the 
success of its application during the Alliance for Progress. 
As a result of this examination, a judgment can now be made 
regarding the theory's viability as a basis for United 
States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.
In chapter one, four assumptions that form the theory 
of underdevelopment and violence were uncovered by examining 
the official documents and statements from the period of the 
Alliance for Progress and the findings and recommendations 
of the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central 
America. The first assumption indicates that economic,
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political, and social underdevelopment lead to violence and 
instability. It was believed that frustration over these 
conditions caused people to react violently. The second 
assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause 
the root conditions, economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be 
characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment 
leads to violence and instability which in turn foster 
increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes 
that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, 
and instability encourage communist subversion and 
revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that 
violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be 
stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social 
development.
In chapter two, the analysis of the theoretical 
foundations of the theory of underdevelopment and violence 
focused on three questions. First, can it be stated with 
certainty that economic, political, and social 
underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist 
encroachment? Second, are all three conditions of 
underdevelopment equally important or does economic 
underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability? And 
third, do the relationships proposed by the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence provide a foundation for 
defined policies with specific objectives? The conclusions
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illustrated that the relationships proposed by the theory of 
underdevelopment and violence are uncertain, and thus do not 
provide a sufficient foundation for policy. Without knowing 
the type and magnitude of underdevelopment that will cause 
violence, policymakers cannot establish a cause and effect 
relationship that will allow them to develop plans of action 
with definite goals. The theory of underdevelopment and 
violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge 
except for the very general idea that various kinds of 
underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the 
occurrence of violence.
In the third chapter, three perspectives, the liberal, 
radical, and bureaucratic, were used to appraise the success 
of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as it was 
applied during the Alliance for Progress.
According to the liberal perspective, the Alliance 
failed because of the incorrect assumption that the middle 
class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry 
out development programs.
The theory of underdevelopment and violence was 
conceived and implemented exclusively from the perspective 
of U.S. middle class values and desires— not Latin American. 
The cause of the Alliance's problems can be attributed to 
the attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the 
different middle class values in Latin America. As a 
result, the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of
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underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for 
Progress resulted not as much from the theory's assumptions, 
but that the remedy for overcoming violence through the 
extension of development assistance, which reflected U.S. 
middle class values, would not apply in countries that had 
completely different middle class values.
Unlike the liberal account of the Alliance for 
Progress, the radical perspective rests upon the supposition 
that the very nature of U.S. involvement in Latin America is 
exploitive. According to radicals, the Alliance for 
Progress was never intended to benefit Latin America. Its 
purpose was to subsidize U.S. foreign investors. Its aim 
also included protecting U.S. overseas businesses by 
withholding or releasing Alliance funds to Latin American 
governments.
However, if we overlook the radical assumption that 
U.S. policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S. 
businesses, insight can be gained as to the success of the 
Alliance for Progress.
Considering that U.S. business interests are not 
necessarily paramount to U.S. foreign policy, but do 
represent an important force, the value of the radical view 
emerges in its recognition that these interests did not 
coincide with the theory of economic, political and social 
development in Latin America. Business interests were 
clearly important considerations during the Alliance for
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Progress and did affect policy. What the radical 
perspective provides is the recognition that U.S. foreign 
policy is affected by business interests and that these 
interests are not necessarily devoted to economic, 
political, and social development in Latin America.
Finally, the bureaucratic perspective presented a 
critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of 
the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who 
create, influence, and implement foreign policy. Writers 
who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the 
Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional 
setting were the normal foreign policy participants were 
excluded. Based on the crisis tone of the administration's 
appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to 
restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of 
advisors, those organizations and individuals responsible 
for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its 
creation, but however, were able to gain considerable 
influence over its direction once the programs were put into 
action.
Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the 
direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the 
Agency for International Development (AID). The successful 
reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the 
passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The resurgence of 
AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over
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the desire to counter communist influence with short-term 
highly visible programs rather than the more long-term 
development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's 
founders.
In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and 
violence, in its present form, does not represent a viable 
foundation for United States foreign policy in under­
developed countries of the world. The theory consists of an 
unproven set of assumptions that do not establish a solid 
foundation for foreign policy. In addition, the application 
of the theory during the Alliance demonstrated numerous 
problems. First, the theory is based on U.S. middle class 
values and desires. Its success is dependent upon the 
acceptance of these values in societies were middle class 
values are not the same. Unless the theory can be modified 
to reflect the values of the society to which it will be 
applied, it will likely encounter the same problems.
Second, business interests affect foreign policy and they do 
not necessarily coincide with economic, political, and 
social development policies. And third, during the 
Alliance, the theory of underdevelopment and violence was 
conceived and implemented without the participation of many 
traditional foreign policy actors. Once those traditional 
players were called upon to implement the Alliance, they 
were able to transform the program to suit their interests 
and concerns. Due to the nature of the U.S. foreign policy
process, it is likely that the theory of underdevelopment 
and violence would be subjected to the same pressures if 
were to be set in motion again.
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